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Lipschitz continuity of the solutions to team
optimization problems revisited
Giorgio Gnecco and Marcello Sanguineti
Abstract—Sufficient conditions for the existence and Lipschitz
continuity of optimal strategies for static team optimization problems
are studied. Revised statements and proofs of some results in “Kim
K.H., Roush F.W., Team Theory. Ellis Horwood Limited Publishers,
Chichester, UK, 1987” are presented.
Keywords—Statistical information structure, team utility function,
value of a team, Lipschitz continuity.
I. INTRODUCTION
In team optimization problems, a group of decision makers
(DMs), each having at disposal some information and vari-
ous possibilities of decisions, is interested in maximizing a
common goal, expressed via a team utility function. Each DM
takes a decision as a function, called strategy, of its available
information. In the model that we adopt in this paper, the
information is expressed via a probability density function, so
we have a statistical information structure [3, Chapter 3]. We
consider static team optimization problems [5], in which the
information of each DM depends on a random variable, called
state of the world, but not on the decisions of the other DMs.
Otherwise, one has a dynamic team optimization problem;
it was shown in [8] that many dynamic team optimization
problems can be reformulated in terms of equivalent static
ones.
Closed-form solutions for both static and dynamic team
optimization problems can be derived only under quite strong
assumptions on the team utility function and the way in which
each DM’s information is influenced by the state of the world
(and, in the case of dynamic teams, by the decisions of the
other DMs) [3]. If these conditions are not met, one has to
search for approximate solutions. In such a case, knowing
structural properties of optimal strategies (e.g., Lipschitz con-
tinuity) is useful to find good suboptimal strategies.
The aim of this paper is to present revised statements
and proofs of some results appeared in [3, Section 5.2] on
existence and Lipschitz continuity of optimal strategies for
a family of static team optimization problems. Although the
book [3] offers an interesting and inspirational exposition of
the mathematical theory of team optimization problems, it
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contains various misprints, omissions, and technical incon-
sistencies, probably due to a too fast and inaccurate writing.
These drawbacks were pointed out from the very beginning in
a couple of reviews [4], [6]. We quote from [6]: “The strength
of the book lies in the power and originality of the ideas used
to achieve its stated goal of extending the theory of teams in
a number of new directions” but “Unfortunately, the book is
beset with a variety of technical problems that will prevent
all but the most tolerant, persistent, and experienced readers
from reaping the benefits of the later chapters”. We hope that
our work will make the revisited results more easily accessible
and usable.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces
definitions and assumptions and formulates the family of static
team optimization problems under consideration. Section III
presents revised statements and proofs of some results ap-
peared in [3].
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The context in which we shall formalize the optimization
problem and state the results is the following.
• Static team of n decision makers (DMs), i = 1, . . . , n.
• x ∈ X ⊆ Rd0 : vector-valued random variable, called
state of the world, describing a stochastic environment.
The vector x models the uncertainties in the external
world, which are not controlled by the DMs.
• yi ∈ Yi ⊆ R
di : vector-valued random variable, which
represents the information that the DM i has about x.
• si : Yi → Ai ⊆ R: Borel-measurable strategy of the i-th
DM.
• ai = si(yi): decision that the DM i chooses on the basis
of the information yi.
• u : X × Πni=1Yi × Π
n
i=1Ai ⊆ R
N → R, where N =∑n
i=0 di + n: real-valued team utility function.
• The information that the n DMs have on the state of the
world x is modelled by an n-tuple of random variables
y1, . . . , yn, i.e., by a statistical information structure [3,
Chapter 3] represented by a joint probability density
q(x, y1, . . . , yn) on the set X ×Πni=1Yi.
We formulate the following static team optimization
problem.
Problem STO (Static Team Optimization with Sta-
tistical Information). Given the statistical information
structure q(x, y1, . . . , yn) and the team utility function
u(x, y1, . . . , yn, a1, . . . , an), find
sup
s1,...sn
v(s1, . . . , sn) ,
where
v(s1, . . . , sn) = Ex,y1,...,yn {u(x, {yi}
n
i=1, {si(yi)}
n
i=1)} .
The quantity sups1,...sn v(s1, . . . , sn) is called the value of
the team.
Throughout the paper, we make the following two
assumptions.
A1 The set X of the states of the world is compact, Y1, . . . , Yn
are compact and convex, and A1, . . . , An are bounded closed
intervals. The team utility u is of class C2 on an open set
containing X × Πni=1Yi × Πni=1Ai and q is a (strictly) positive
probability density on X × Πni=1Yi, which can be extended to
a function of class C2 on an open set containing X ×Πni=1Yi.
For τ > 0, a concave function f defined on a convex set
Ω ⊆ Rd has concavity (at least) τ if for all u, v ∈ Ω and every
supergradient1 pu of f at u one has f(v)−f(u) ≤ pu·(v−u)−
τ‖v− u‖2. If f is of class C2(Ω), then a necessary condition
for its concavity τ is supu∈Ω λmax(∇2f(u)) ≤ −τ , where
λmax(∇
2f(u)) is the maximum eigenvalue of the Hessian
∇2f(u). Indeed,
f(v)− f(u) ≤ pu · (v − u)− τ‖v − u‖
2
implies
f(v) +
1
2
τ‖v‖2 − f(u)−
1
2
τ‖u‖2
≤ pu · (v − u)− τ‖v − u‖
2 +
1
2
τ‖v‖2 −
1
2
τ‖u‖2
= (pu + τu) · (v − u)−
τ
2
‖v − u‖2
≤ (pu + τu) · (v − u) ,
i.e., f(·) + 12τ‖ · ‖
2 is concave, then one applies the
characterization of concavity for a function of class C2.
A2 There exists τ > 0 such that the team utility function
u : X × Πni=1Yi × Π
n
i=1Ai → R is separately concave with
concavity τ in each of the decision variables2.
Assumption A2 is motivated by tractability reasons and
encountered in practice. For example, in economic problems
it is motivated by the “law of diminishing returns”, i.e.,
the fact that the marginal productivity of an input usually
diminishes as the amount of output increases [5, p. 99 and p.
110].
1For Ω ⊆ Rd convex and f : Ω→ R concave, pu ∈ Rd is a supergradient
of f at u ∈ Ω if for every v ∈ Ω it satisfies f(v)− f(u) ≤ pu · (v − u) .
2I.e., if all the arguments of u are fixed except the decision variable ai,
then the resulting function of ai has concavity τ .
III. LIPSCHITZ CONTINUITY OF THE OPTIMAL STRATEGIES
In this section, we shall give conditions that guarantee
existence and Lipschitz continuity of optimal strategies for
Problem STO.
The next lemma is obtained making various changes and
corrections to [3, Lemma 10, p. 162].
Lemma 1: Let q(γ) be a probability density for the real
vector-valued random variable γ with values in Γ ⊆ Rmγ ,
Z = Rm or Z a compact subset of Rm, and {fγ} a set of
functions fγ : Z → R, parameterized by γ, equiLipschitz with
constant L and concavity τ . If for every z ∈ Z the function
fγ(z) : Γ→ R is Borel-measurable, then the function defined
for every z ∈ Z as f(z) =
∫
Γ
q(γ)fγ(z)dγ is Lipschitz with
constant L and concavity τ .
Proof. Lipschitz continuity with constant L follows by
|f(z)− f(w)| =
∣∣∣∣
∫
Γ
q(γ)[fγ(z)− fγ(w)]dγ
∣∣∣∣
≤
∫
Γ
q(γ)L‖z − w‖dγ = L‖z − w‖ .
Let us prove the statement about concavity. By assumption,
for every γ ∈ Γ we have
fγ(z)− fγ(w) ≤ aγ(w) · (z − w)− τ‖z − w‖
2 , (1)
where aγ(w) is a supergradient of fγ at w.
By [2, Proposition 2.2.7, p. 36 and Theorem 2.7.2, p. 76]
(which can be applied since, if Z = Rm or is a compact
subset of Rm, then Z is separable), every supergradient a(w)
of f(z) =
∫
Γ
q(γ)fγ(z) dγ at w can be written in the form
a(w) =
∫
Γ
q(γ)amγ (w)dγ , (2)
where amγ (w) is a measurable selection (with respect to γ) of
the set ∂fγ(w) of all supergradients of fγ at w. With such a
choice of the supergradient, by taking expectations in (1) and
using (2) we get
f(z)− f(w) =
∫
Γ
q(γ)[fγ(z)− fγ(w)]dγ
≤
∫
Γ
q(γ)amγ (w)dγ · (z − w)− τ‖z − w‖
2
= a(w) · (z − w)− τ‖z − w‖2 ,
i.e., f has concavity τ . 
In the proof of Theorem 1, we shall exploit the following
known result, which for completeness we report here together
with its proof.
Lemma 2: Let Z be a subset of a normed linear space, {fk}
a sequence of real-valued functions on Z, equiLipschitz with
constant L. If for every z ∈ Z their point-wise limit f(z) =
limk→∞ fk(z) exists, then f is Lipschitz with constant L.
Proof. By hypothesis, for every x, y ∈ Z we have |fk(y) −
fk(x)| ≤ L‖y−x‖. Then, limk→∞ |fk(y)−fk(x)| = |f(y)−
f(x)| ≤ L‖y − x‖. 
The following theorem, obtained making various changes
and corrections to [3, Theorem 11, p. 162], provides
conditions guaranteeing that Problem STO has a solution
made of an n-tuple of Lipschitz strategies.
Theorem 1: Under Assumptions A1 and A2, Problem STO
admits Lipschitz optimal strategies.
Proof. We detail the proof for the case of n = 2 DMs, then
we mention the changes required for the extension to n > 2.
Proof for n = 2.
Consider a sequence {sj1, s
j
2} of pairs of strategies, indexed
by j ∈ N+, such that
lim
j→∞
v(sj1, s
j
2) = sup
s1,s2
v(s1, s2)
(such a sequence exists by the definition of supremum). From
this sequence, we generate another sequence {sˆj1, sˆ
j
2} defined
for every y1 ∈ Y1 and every y2 ∈ Y2 as
sˆ
j
1(y1) = argmax
a1∈A1
Ex,y2 |y1{u(x, y1, y2, a1, s
j
2(y2))} , (3)
sˆ
j
2(y2) = argmax
a2∈A2
Ex,y1 |y2{u(x, y1, y2, sˆ
j
1(y1), a2)} . (4)
The proof is structured in the following steps.
Step 1. For every j ∈ N+, sˆj1 and sˆ
j
2 are well-defined
(i.e., the maxima in (3) and (4) exist and are unique)
and Borel-measurable, so it makes sense to evaluate
v(sˆj1, sˆ
j
2). By construction, v(sˆ
j
1, sˆ
j
2) ≥ v(s
j
1, s
j
2), then
limj→∞ v(sˆ
j
1, sˆ
j
2) = sups1,s2 v(s1, s2).
Step 2. For every j ∈ N+, the functions sˆj1 and sˆ
j
2 are
Lipschitz, with a constant independent of j.
Step 3. For every j ∈ N+, the functions sˆj1 and sˆ
j
2 are
equibounded and uniformly equicontinuous, so we can
apply Ascoli-Arzela`’s theorem [1, Theorem 1.30, p. 10] to
obtain convergence of a subsequence to a pair of continuous
strategies {so1, so2}.
Step 4. We exploit Lemma 2 and continuity of the
functional v(s1, s2) to show that the pair of strategies
{so1, s
o
2} is Lipschitz and optimal.
Step 1. We make the proof for sˆj1; the same arguments hold
for sˆj2. Let us show that for every j ∈ N+ the functions sˆ
j
1
are well-defined and continuous, hence Borel-measurable. Let
M
j
1 (y1, a1) = Ex,y2|y1{u(x, y1, y2, a1, s
j
2(y2))} .
By the definition,
sˆ
j
1(y1) = argmax
a1∈A1
M
j
1 (y1, a1) . (5)
As the probability density q(x, y1, y2) is continuous and
strictly positive on an open set containing X × Y1 × Y2, the
conditional density q(x, y2|y1) is continuous on X ×Y1×Y2.
Since q(x, y2|y1) and u are continuous on compact sets, they
are uniformly continuous. So M j1 , as an integral dependent on
parameters, is continuous on the compact set Y1×A1. As u is
of class C1 on a compact set, it is Lipschitz continuous thereon,
too. Let L be an upper bound on its Lipschitz constant. For
every y1, by Lemma 1 M j1 is Lipschitz in the second variable
a1 with constant L, and has concavity τ in a1.
By the continuity and concavity properties of M j1 with
respect to a1, the maximum in (5) exists and is unique, so
sˆ
j
1 is well-defined. Let y′1, y′′1 ∈ Y1. By the definition of sˆ
j
1,
exploiting the concavity τ of M j1 with respect to a1 and taking
the supergradient 0 of M j1 with respect to the second variable
at (y′1, sˆ
j
1(y
′
1)) and (y′′1, sˆ
j
1(y
′′
1)), respectively, we get
M
j
1 (y
′
1, sˆ
j
1(y
′′
1))−M
j
1 (y
′
1, sˆ
j
1(y
′
1))
≤ −τ |sˆj1(y
′′
1)− sˆ
j
1(y
′
1)|
2 (6)
and
M
j
1 (y
′′
1, sˆ
j
1(y
′
1))−M
j
1 (y
′′
1, sˆ
j
1(y
′′
1))
≤ −τ |sˆj1(y
′
1)− sˆ
j
1(y
′′
1)|
2 . (7)
By (6) and (7) we get
|M j1 (y
′
1, sˆ
j
1(y
′′
1))−M
j
1 (y
′
1, sˆ
j
1(y
′
1))|
+ |M j1 (y
′′
1, sˆ
j
1(y
′
1))−M
j
1 (y
′′
1, sˆ
j
1(y
′′
1))|
≥ 2τ |sˆj1(y
′′
1)− sˆ
j
1(y
′
1)|
2 . (8)
By (8) we obtain
|sˆj1(y
′′
1)− sˆ
j
1(y
′
1)| ≤
√
L
τ
√
‖y′′1 − y
′
1‖ , (9)
which proves the Ho¨lder continuity of sˆj1, hence its continuity.
Continuity of sˆj2 can be proved in the same way.
Step 2. Let us prove that sˆj1 and sˆ
j
2 are Lipschitz with a
Lipschitz constant independent of j. We make the proof for
sˆ
j
1; the same arguments hold for sˆ
j
2. To this end, as Y1 is
convex it is sufficient to prove that the restriction of sˆj1 to each
line joining every two points y′1 and y′′1 is Lipschitz, with a
constant that depends neither on j, nor on the line. Consider
the function sˆj1(y1(t)), where y1(t) = y′1 + t(y′′1 − y′1) and
0 ≤ t ≤ 1. There are two possible cases:
1) either sˆj1(y1(t)), for all 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, is interior to A1 =
[al1, a
u
1 ],
2) or there exists t˜ ∈ [0, 1] such that sˆj1(y1(t˜)) is one of
the two extremes al1, au1 of A1.
Case 1. When sˆj1(y1) = argmaxa1∈A1 M
j
1 (y1, a1) is an
interior point of A1 = [al1, au1 ], we have
∂M
j
1
∂a1
∣∣∣
a1=sˆ
j
1
(y1(t))
= 0 . (10)
As M j1 is of class C2 and has concavity τ in a1,
∂2M
j
1
∂a1
2 ≤
−τ < 0, then we can apply the implicit function theorem to
the function
σ1(t) = sˆ
j
1(y1(t)) .
Taking the total derivative with respect to t of both sides of
(10), we get
d1∑
k=1
(
∂2M
j
1
∂σ1
2
∂σ1
∂y1,k
∂y1,k
∂t
+
∂2M
j
1
∂σ1∂y1,k
∂y1,k
∂t
)
=
=
∂2M
j
1
∂σ1
2
d1∑
k=1
∂σ1
∂y1,k
∂y1,k
∂t
+
d1∑
k=1
∂2M
j
1
∂σ1∂y1,k
∂y1,k
∂t
= 0 . (11)
Then σ1(t) is locally differentiable and by (11) we have
dσ1(t)
dt
=
d1∑
k=1
∂σ1
∂y1,k
∂y1,k
∂t
= ... =
= −
(
∂2M
j
1
∂σ1
2
)−1 d1∑
k=1
∂2M
j
1
∂σ1∂y1,k
(y′′1,k − y
′
1,k) .
As
∣∣∣∂2Mj1∂σ12
∣∣∣−1 ≤ 1τ and |y′′1,k − y′1,k| ≤ diameter (Y1), it
remains to find for every k an upper bound on
∣∣∣ ∂2Mj1∂σ1∂y1,k
∣∣∣ in
(12), independent of y1 and j. By the definition,
M
j
1 (y1, a1) =
∫
X×Y2
q(x, y1, y2)u(x, y1, y2, a1, s
j
2(y2))dxdy2∫
X×Y2
q(x, y1, y2)dxdy2
.
Some elementary calculations allow to express ∂
2M
j
1
∂a1∂y1,k
as a
ratio whose numerator is a polynomial in
∫
X×Y2
∂i[q(x, y1, y2)u(x, y1, y2, a1, s
j
2(y2))]
∂a1
a∂y1,k
b
dxdy2
and ∫
X×Y2
∂iq(x, y1, y2)
∂a1
a∂y1,k
b
dxdy2
for i = 0, 1, 2, a+ b = i, whereas its denominator is(∫
X×Y2
q(x, y1, y2)dxdy2
)3
≥ δ > 0 ,
where δ is a positive constant (indepedent of y1), whose
existence and independence from y1 are guaranteed by the
hypothesis q(x, y1, y2) > 0 and the continuity of q(x, y1, y2)
on the compact set X × Y1 × Y2. Note that the change of
order between expectation and up-to-second-order partial
derivatives is justified by the fact that q(x, y1, y2) and
u(x, y1, y2, a1, a2) are of class C2 on compact sets.
Then an upper bound on
∣∣∣ ∂2Mj1∂a1∂y1,k
∣∣∣ can be expressed in
terms of the finite quantities
sup
y1∈Y1
∫
X×Y2
sup
a2∈A2
∣∣∣∣∣∂
i[q(x, y1, y2)u(x, y1, y2, a1, a2)]
∂a1
a∂y1,k
b
∣∣∣∣∣ dxdy2
and
sup
y1∈Y1
∫
X×Y2
sup
a2∈A2
∣∣∣∣∣∂
iq(x, y1, y2)
∂a1
a∂y1,k
b
∣∣∣∣∣ dxdy2 ,
where measurability of the integrands follows by [7, Property
(c), p. 38]. This bound does not depend on y1. Moreover, it
does not depend on the particular choice of sj2(y2), so it is
also independent of j.
Summing up, we obtain an upper bound independent of y1
and j on
∣∣∣d σ1(t)d t ∣∣∣.
Case 2. We now consider the case in which there exists
t˜ ∈ [0, 1] such that sˆj1(y1(t˜)) is one of the two extremes
al1, a
u
1 of A1. Suppose, e.g., that sˆ
j
1(y1(t˜)) = a
l
1. The situation
sˆ
j
1(y1(t˜)) = a
u
1 can be studied in the same way. We can limit
the analysis to the case in which y1(t˜) does not belong to the
boundary of Y1, which has d1-dimensional measure equal to
0, due to the convexity and boundedness of Y1. There are two
possible subcases.
• Subcase 1: there exists a neighbourhood of t˜ such that
y1(t) = a
l
1 does never hold (except for t = t˜). Then one
has
lim
t→t˜−
dsˆ
j
1(y1(t))
dt
= lim
t→t˜+
dsˆ
j
1(y1(t))
dt
= 0 ,
hence dsˆ
j
1
(y1(t))
dt
|t=t˜ = 0. Indeed, sˆ
j
1 is continuously
differentiable with derivative (12) when the maximum is
interior to A1 and the limit is 0 (as the maximum is not
allowed to be outside A1);
• Subcase 2: there exists a non-constant sequence {t¯l} such
that liml→∞ t¯l = t˜ and y1(t¯l) = al1, ∀l ∈ N+. In
general, this does not allow one to deduce the existence of
dsˆ
j
1
(y1(t))
dt
|t=t˜. However, if one considers the incremental
ratio sˆ
j
1
(y1(t))−sˆ
j
1
(y1(t˜))
t−t˜
and any sequence {tl} (which can
be different from {t¯l}) such that liml→∞ tl = t˜, then the
lim sup on {tl} of the absolute value of that incremental
ratio is bounded from above by a constant independent
of t˜ and j (this can be easily proved by using the results
of Case 1).
Case 1 and Case 2 together imply that sˆj1 is Lipschitz with a
constant independent of j.
Step 3. The functions belonging to {sˆj1} and {sˆ
j
2} are
equibounded, as A1 and A2 are bounded intervals, and
uniformly equicontinuous, thanks to the uniform bound
on their Lipschitz constants. Then, by Ascoli-Arzela`’s
theorem, there exists a subsequence of {sˆj1, sˆ
j
2} that converges
uniformly to a pair of countinuous strategies {so1, so2} on the
compact set Y1 × Y2.
Step 4. By Lemma 2 the limit strategies {so1, so2} are
Lipschitz, with the same bound on their Lipschitz constants.
Since the functional
v(s1, s2) = Ex,y1,y2{u(x, y1, y2, s1(y1), s2(y2))}
is continuous for s1 ∈ C(Y1) and s2 ∈ C(Y2) with the
respective maximum norms, we finally obtain
v(so1, s
o
2) = lim
j→∞
v(sˆj1, sˆ
j
2) = sup
s1,s2
v(s1, s2) .

Extension to n ≥ 2.
The only significant change in the proof consists in defining
as follows the n-tuple sˆj1, . . . , sˆjn of strategies:
sˆ
j
1
(y1) =
argmax
a1∈A1
Ex,{yi}i6=1 |y1{u(x, {yi}
n
i=1, a1, {s
j
i (yi)}
n
i=2)} ,
sˆ
j
2
(y2) =
argmax
a2∈A2
Ex,{yi}i6=2 |y2{u(x, {yi}
n
i=1, sˆ
j
1
(y1), a2, {s
j
i (yi)}
n
i=3)})} ,
. . .
sˆ
j
n(yn) =
argmax
an∈An
Ex,{yi}i6=n |yn{u(x, {yi}
n
i=1, {sˆ
j
i (yi)}
n−1
i=1 , an)} .

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